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TORT LAW - PRIVATE NUISANCE - ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT - RESI-
DENTIAL SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS - The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held that an owner of a solar-heated residence, who alleged
that an adjoining neighbor's proposed construction of a residence
would interfere with his access to unobstructed sunlight, stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted under a theory of private
nuisance.
Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
During 1978, Glen Prah constructed a home with a solar heat-
ing system' on property he owned in Waukesha County, Wiscon-
sin.2 Richard D. Maretti subsequently purchased the vacant lot ad-
jacent to and immediately south of Prah's property.3 In September
of 1980, Maretti submitted plans to the Architectural Control
Committee and the Planning Commission of the City of Muskego
for the construction of a house on his property.4 Upon learning of
the details of Maretti's plans, Prah expressed concern that the effi-
ciency of his solar system would be substantially impaired if
Maretti's house was constructed as proposed.' Prah asked Marettil
1. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
The solar energy system, which provided the plaintiff with heat and hot water, consisted of
solar panels placed on the entire southern roof exposure. The system had been in operation
for two years prior to this dispute and had supplied the home with approximately 55-60%
of its energy requirements. This resulted in an estimated annual savings of $600 to Prah. Id.
at 3-4.
2. Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 225, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1982). Prah's residence
was the first home built in the development and although it was not situated in the center
of the lot, the dwelling complied with deed and zoning restrictions. Id. at 226, 321 N.W.2d
at 185. See Appellant's Brief at 3.
3. 108 Wis. 2d at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 184. See Appellant's Brief at 4.
4. 108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185. See Appellant's Brief at 4. The Architec-
tural Control Committee and the Planning Commission of the City of Muskego approved
Maretti's proposed plans, including the location of the dwelling on the lot. 108 Wis. 2d at
226, 321 N.W.2d at 185. A dispute of fact existed concerning the issuance of building per-
mits and the commencement of construction without prior approval. Apparently Maretti
changed the grade of the lot without first notifying the Architectural Control Committee.
While these facts are not relevant to this appeal, they do become material on remand in
determining the reasonableness of Maretti's conduct. Id. at 226 n.2, 321 N.W.2d at 815 n.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
5. 108 Wis. 2d at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 184. The problem with the plans developed from
a combination of the grade of the property and the distance between the homes. Id. at 226,
321 N.W.2d at 185. Maximum efficiency of the system depended on the absence of any
interference with sunlight shining directly on the collectors. Expert testimony indicated that
the shadow of the Maretti home on the collectors would not only reduce the efficiency of the
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to alter his plans by locating his home an additional several feet
away from Prah's lot line; however, the parties failed to reach an
agreement and Maretti commenced construction of his home.'
After filing suit in the Waukesha County Circuit Court 8 Prah
moved for a temporary injunction to enjoin and restrain Maretti
from continuing construction.9 Circuit Judge Raskin denied Prah's
motion for a temporary injunction and entered a summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant.10 On appeal, the case was certified
to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin by the Court of Appeals" as
presenting an issue of first impression of whether an owner of a
solar-heated residence states an actionable claim by asserting that
the proposed construction of a neighboring building interferes with
access to unobstructed sunlight across the neighbor's property. 2
Justice Abrahamson, writing for the majority, ruled that the
case should be considered as an appeal from a summary judgment
rather than as an appeal from a judgment after trial because the
circuit court indicated that it had disposed of the case on that ba-
sis." ' She noted that on such an appeal, the first issue to be ad-
system, but would also create a potential for freezing, resulting in cracked panels and exten-
sive water damage to the home. Appellant's Brief at 3-4.
6. The issue of whether notice to Maretti prior to purchase of the property should
have been given is discussed in Justice Callow's dissent. See infra text accompanying notes
83 & 102-03.
7. 108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185.
8. The plaintiff's complaint seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief alleged
that he was entitled to "unrestricted use of the sun and its solar power." Id. at 225, 321
N.W.2d at 184.
9. Id. at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 184. See Appellant's Brief at 1.
10. 108 Wis. 2d at 227, 321 N.W.2d at 185. The circuit court held that Prah did not
present a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 185.
11. Id. at 224, 321 N.W.2d at 184. The case was certified pursuant to WIs. STAT. §
809.61 (1981-1982) which provides: "The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal
or other proceedings in the court of appeals upon certification by the Court of Ap-
peals .... Id.
12. 108 Wis. 2d at 224, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
13. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 184. Justice Ceci did not participate in the decision, id. at 243,
321 N.W.2d at 192, and Justice Callow filed a dissenting opinion, id., 321 N.W.2d at 193.
14. Id. at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 185. The defendant contended that because the court
heard testimony at the hearing, received the evidence and viewed the site, the case should
be treated as an appeal from a judgment after trial. Id. at 227, 321 N.W.2d at 185. Justice
Abrahamson explained that when a party moves for a temporary injunction, the court must
consider whether the moving party has a reasonable probability of ultimate success; the
court does not determine whether the moving party will in fact ultimately prevail in the
lawsuit. See Werner v. Grootemaat, 80 Wis. 2d 513, 520, 259 N.W.2d 310, 314 (1977) (in
determining whether to grant a temporary injunction the court should consider whether the
plaintiff would be entitled to a permanent injunction; if he would not be so entitled, the
temporary injunction should not be granted). When the circuit court denied the plaintiff's
motion for a temporary injunction, it concluded that there was no reasonable probability
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dressed is whether the complaint stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted.1 5 If the complaint stated a cause of action, and
indicated that factual issues were in dispute, the court must next
consider affidavits and other proof to determine whether a dispute
of facts exists that would entitle the nonmoving party to a trial.16
Justice Abrahamson emphasized that when a court entertains a
motion for summary judgment, it does not resolve disputed issues
of fact, only whether issues of fact exist.
1 7
In the instant case, Justice Abrahamson examined the suffi-
ciency of the complaint because it was unclear whether the circuit
court's ruling was based solely on the pleadings or had included a
consideration of factual matters outside of the pleadings." She ob-
served that in testing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts are re-
quired to accept the plaintiff's allegations and resulting inferences
therefrom as true,19 and to construe the pleadings liberally.20 Com-
plaints should be dismissed only when there are no circumstances
under which the plaintiff can prevail.21
Justice Abrahamson reviewed the circuit court's considerations
of the plaintiff's three legal theories. In ruling on the plaintiff's
claim of common law private nuisance, the circuit court had em-
ployed a balancing test, weighing the gravity of harm to the plain-
that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail and that he had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Justice Abrahamson determined that the circuit court clearly
expressed an intent to deal with the case on a motion for summary judgment when it noted:
"In as much [sic] as the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which equitable relief can be granted, and the parties having joined issue, the court
will entertain a motion by the defendant for summary judgment." 108 Wis. 2d at 228, 321
N.W.2d at 185.
15. 108 Wis. 2d at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 185. See Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426,
435, 291 N.W.2d 864, 868 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (in reviewing an order for a
summary judgment a court must first determine if the complaint states a claim for which
relief can be granted).
16. 108 Wis. 2d at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 185-86.
17. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 186. See Coleman v. Outboard Marine Corp., 92 Wis. 2d 565,
570-71, 285 N.W.2d 631, 634 (1979) (if material presented on a motion for summary judg-
ment is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable people might differ as to its sig-
nificance, it would be improper to grant the motion).
18. 108 Wis. 2d at 228, 321 N.W.2d at 186.
19. Id. at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186. See Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 86
Wis. 2d 1, 4-5, 271 N.W.2d 598, 599 (1978) (all well-pleaded material statements of fact are
considered true while legal conclusions or erroneous conclusions from the facts as pleaded
are not).
20. 108 Wis. 2d at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186. "All pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice." Wis. STAT. § 802.02(6) (1981-1982).
21. 108 Wis. 2d at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186. See Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin
Rules of Civil Procedure, chs. 801-803, 59 MARQ. L. Rav. 1, 54 (1976) cited with approval in
Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979).
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tiff against the utility of the defendant's conduct, and had con-
cluded that the defendant's conduct did not cause the gravity of
the harm which the plaintiff himself may have avoided by proper
planning.2 In addressing the plaintiff's second contention that the
defendant's construction contravened Wisconsin statute section
844.01,8 the circuit court had determined that the section was in-
applicable because the dwelling complied with deed and zoning re-
strictions.2 ' Finally, the circuit court had rejected the plaintiff's
contention that he had acquired a solar easement under the doc-
trine of prior appropriation.2 -
In considering whether the plaintiff's complaint stated a com-
mon law private nuisance claim, Justice Abrahamson observed that
a Wisconsin landowner does not have an absolute or unlimited
right to use the land when such use would unreasonably impair the
rights or enjoyment of others.2 Because the rights of neighboring
landowners are relative, the private nuisance doctrine had been
used in Wisconsin to balance conflicting interests 7 when a land-
owner's use of property unreasonably interfered with another land-
22. 10S Wis. 2d at 230, 321 N.W.2d at 186.
23. Section 844.01 provides:
Physical injury to, or interference with, real property
(1) Any person owning or claiming an interest in real property may bring an
action claiming physical injury to, or interference with, the property or his interest
therein; the action may be to redress past injury, or for other appropriate relief.
(2) Physical injury includes unprivileged intrusions and encroachments; the in-
jury may be surface, subsurface, or suprasurface; the injury may arise from activities
on the plaintiff's property, or from activities outside the plaintiff's property which
affect plaintiff's property.
(3) Interference with an interest is any activity other than physical injury which
lessens the possibility of use or enjoyment of the interest.
(4) The lessening of a security interest without physical injury is not actionable
unless such lessening constitutes waste.
WIs. STAT. § 844.01 (1981-1982).
24. 108 Wis. 2d at 230, 321 N.W.2d at 186.
25. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 186. The circuit court had criticized the doctrine as "an intru-
sion of judicial egoism over legislative passivity." Id., 321 N.W.2d at 186. According to the
doctrine of prior appropriation, the first user to appropriate a resource has the exclusive
right to continued use of the resource. Id. n.4, 321 N.W.2d at 186 n.4. See Note, The Alloca-
tion of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 COLO. L. REv. 421,
436 (1976).
26. 108 Wis. 2d at 230, 321 N.W.2d at 187.
27. See Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977). (the court deter-
mined that obstruction of a right-of-way, although not a physical encroachment upon the
easement, constituted a nuisance); Abdella v. Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967)
(the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant's use of land as a riding academy was
unreasonable in light of the nature of the area).
1162
1983 Recent Decisions 1163
owner's enjoyment of property.2 8 In assessing the merits of private
nuisance claims, Wisconsin courts have adopted the private nui-
sance analysis expounded in section 821D of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.2"
Noting that the Restatement's broad concept of private nuisance
seemed to include the defendant's obstruction of the plaintiff's ac-
cess to sunlight,30 Justice Abrahamson addressed the defendant's
contention that because the development of his property complied
with statutes, ordinances, and zoning restrictions, he could ignore
the effect of such development upon his neighbor's solar system."'
Justice Abrahamson observed that it is incorrect to assume that
the right to develop one's land is per se superior to a neighbor's
interest in access to unobstructed sunlight 2 and the rights of a
surface owner are not unlimited.3"
The majority corrected the defendant's mistaken assertion that
the common law did not recognize a landowner's access to sunlight
28. 108 Wis. 2d at 231, 321 N.W.2d at 187. See Hoene v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209,
214, 116 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1962) ("[p]rivate nuisance is a term applied to an unreasonable
interference with the interests of an individual in the use or enjoyment of land"); Metzger v.
Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 269, 83 N.W. 308, 309 (1900) (an actionable nuisance is an unlawful
use of one's property which causes physical injury to the property rights of another). See
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 591 (4th ed. 1971).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977). See CEW Management Corp. v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 633, 277 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1979) (all of the
interlocking sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are applicable where there is a
claimed invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land).
30. "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the pri-
vate use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977). Section
821D comment b provides in relevant part
[T]he phrase "interest in the use and enjoyment of land" is used in this Restatement
in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a person may have in the
actual present use of land for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial and
other purposes, but also his interests in having the present use value of the land
unimpaired by changes in its physical condition .... Interest in use and enjoy-
ment" also comprehends the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment that a person normally
derives from the occupancy of land. Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while
using land is often as important to a person as freedom from physical interruption
with his use or freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land
itself.
Id.
31. 108 Wis. 2d at 232, 321 N.W.2d at 187-88.
32. Id. at 232-33, 321 N.W.2d at 188. Justice Abrahamson rejected the position ex-
pressed by the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coleum et ad infernos (the owner
of land owns up to the sky and down to the center of the earth). Id. at 233, 321 N.W.2d at
188.
33. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (the airspace is a public highway
and a landowner owns only as much of the space above ground as he can occupy or use in
connection with the land).
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across adjoining property. According to the English common law
doctrine of "ancient lights," if a landowner received sunlight across
adjoining property for a certain period of time, the landowner
could legally continue to receive unobstructed access to such sun-
light.3 4 The property owner acquired a negative prescriptive ease-
ment and the adjoining landowner was prohibited from obstructing
his neighbor's access to sunlight. 5 Justice Abrahamson noted that
American courts have afforded landowners some protection in ac-
cess to sunlight by honoring express easements to light." Although
the doctrine of ancient lights was initially enforced in American
courts, it was repudiated because it was inconsistent with the
needs of a developing country. 7
In adjudging "spite fence" cases, many jurisdictions have pro-
tected landowners from malicious obstructions to sunlight under
common law private nuisance.3 " Such malicious activities lacked
utility and caused harm which outweighed any social value.39 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted this posture only after legisla-
tive mandate.40 Thus, in the very narrow context of spite fence
34. 108 Wis. 2d at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188. See W. THOMAS, A. MILLER & R. ROBBINS,
OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 23 (1978).
35. 108 Wis. 2d at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188. See Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protec-
tion of Access to Solar Energy, 68 A.B.A. J. 288 (1982); Comment, Solar Lights: Guarantee-
ing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94 (1977).
36. 108 Wis. 2d at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188.
37. Id. at 233-34, 321 N.W.2d at 188. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously
concluded that easements to light and air over adjacent property could not be created or
acquired by prescription and had refused to recognize such easements by implication. See
Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 408, 232 N.W. 851, 852 (1930); Miller v.
Hoeschler, 126 Wis. 263, 268-69, 105 N.W. 790, 792 (1905).
38. 108 Wis. 2d at 234, 321 N.W.2d at 188. See Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 500, 13
S.E.2d 20, 25 (1941) ("[t]he air and light no matter from which direction they come are
God-given, and are essential to the life, comfort and happiness of everyone"); Barger v.
Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 437, 66 S.E. 439, 440 (1909) ("[l]ight and air are as much a neces-
sity as water, and all are the common heritage of mankind"); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380,
389, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (1888) ("(tlhe right to breathe the air and to enjoy the sunshine, is a
natural one").
39. 108 Wis. 2d at 234, 321 N.W.2d at 188.
40. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 188-89. Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 272, 83 N.W. 308,
310 (1900) (landowner's right to erect a useless, unsightly 16 foot spite fence four feet from
neighbor's window upheld) was overruled by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.08 (West 1958) (repealed
1973), which provided:
(1) Any fence or other structure in the nature of a fence unnecessarily exceeding
six feet in height, maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the
owners or occupants of adjoining property, shall be deemed a private nuisance.
(2) Any such owner or occupant injured either in his comfort or in the enjoyment
of his estate by such fence or other structure, may have an action of tort for the
damages sustained thereby; and the provisions of the statutes, concerning actions for
private nuisances, shall be applicable thereto.
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cases, a landowner's interest in sunlight has been protected by the
common law private nuisance doctrine."' As Justice Abrahamson
explained, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's prior reluctance to pro-
vide greater protection of property owners' access to sunlight ab-
sent legislative approval, was based upon three policy considera-
tions: (1) a landowner had the right to use property as desired,
provided that no physical damage resulted to neighboring proper-
ties; 2 (2) the loss of sunlight was accorded relatively little value by
society because illumination could be provided by artifical sources,
its prime importance being only for aesthetic purposes; and (3) so-
ciety was concerned with promoting land development and the rec-
ognition of rights to sunlight would hinder such development."
Under these policy considerations, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had determined that, in the absence of an express agreement, a
landowner could not sue for an obstruction to access to sunlight.
4
However, Justice Abrahamson observed that these three policies
were now obsolete and inapplicable. 4 She found that society has
more frequently regulated the use of private property for the bene-
fit of the general welfare; '" access to sunlight has taken on added
significance in the late twentieth century as an alternative energy
source;4 7 and society's interest in promoting unhindered private
Id.
41. 108 Wis. 2d at 234-35, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
42. See Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 272, 83 N.W. 308, 310 (1900) (one has a
sovereign right to use one's property as he may as long as such use does not physically
extend outside property boundaries to the detriment of others).
43. 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189. See Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank,
202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930) (easements of light and air over adjacent premises are
not favored because they hinder development); Miller v. Hoeschler, 126 Wis. 263, 105 N.W.
790 (1905) (absent clear necessity, easements to light and air are not favored; such a strict
limitation is essential to easy and rapid development of municipalities); Dillman v. Hoff-
man, 38 Wis. 559, 574, (1875) (the uses of land and of structures on land are more variable
with the growth of population and business; easements by implication may restrict
alienability).
44. See supra note 43.
45. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
46. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 189. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Just
v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
47. "Access to sunlight as an energy source is of significance both to the landowner
who invests in solar collectors and to a society which has an interest in developing alterna-
tive sources of energy." 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. The Wisconsin legislature
has granted tax benefits to encourage the utilization of solar energy. See 1981 Wis. LAws
354, codified at §§ 59.99(7)(d), 66.031, 66.032, 66.033, 236.13(2)(d), 700.35 & 700.40. The
federal government has also recognized the importance of solar energy. See, e.g., Energy
Security Act § 512, 12 U.S.C. § 3610 (Supp V 1981) (financial assistance for installation of
solar energy system); Tax Act of 1978 § 101, 26 U.S.C. § 44(c) (Supp. V 1981) (solar tax
credit).
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land development is no longer realistic.48
Justice Abrahamson recognized the flexibility of the private nui-
sance doctrine for resolving landowner's disputes in the 1980s."
She interpreted State v. Deetz50 as an approval of the application
of private nuisance to landowners' conflicts and as a rejection of
per se exclusions to the reasonable use doctrine in nuisance law."1
Deetz recognized that the common law must change to meet the
realities of modern society and changing social values and condi-
tions.52 On this basis, the majority refused to adhere to the rigid
and inflexible common law rule advocated by the defendant, favor-
ing unhindered land development and ignoring the plaintiff's legit-
imate interest in the enjoyment and use of his land." Justice Abra-
hamson determined that private nuisance law contained the
flexibility to safeguard one landowner's right of access to sunlight
and another's right to develop land, 5 and that it was well-suited to
regulate societal interests and legislative policies in a modern
society.'
5
48. "The need for easy and rapid development is not as great today as it once was,
while our perception of the value of sunlight as a source of energy has increased signifi-
cantly." 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190. See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 224
N.W.2d 407, 414 (1974) ("when a rule of law thwarts social policy rather than promotes it, it
is the obligation of a common law court to undo or modify a rule").
49. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190. See Ballstadt v. Pagel, 202 Wis. 484, 489,
232 N.W. 862, 864 (1930) ("what is regarded in law as constituting a nuisance in modern
times would no doubt have been tolerated without question in former times").
50. 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
51. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
52. Id. at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190. "In Deetz the court abandoned the rigid common
law enemy rule with respect to surface water and adopted the private nuisance reasonable
use rule, namely that the landowner is subject to liability if his or her interference with the
flow of surface waters unreasonably invades a neighbor's interest in the use and enjoyment
of land." Id. at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 2d at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190. The defendant argued that a landowner's
interest in access to sunlight across adjoining property was not legally enforceable and
therefore was excluded per se from private nuisance law according to the holding in Fon-
tainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959),
cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960). See infra text accompanying notes 119-24 & 154 for
a discussion of Fontainebleau. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not find the Fontaine-
bleau court's reasoning persuasive. Justice Abrahamson observed that Fontainebleau's con-
clusion that a landowner has no right to light should have been the court's conclusion and
not its initial premise merely because easements by prescription (the doctrine of "ancient
lights") and easements by implication did not afford a landowner protection. She noted that
the Fontainebleau court did not explain why an owner's interest in unobstructed light dif-
fered from an owner's interest in being free from obtrusive noise or smoke or from an inter-
est in unobstructed use of water. Finally, she noted that an absolute per se exception could
invite unreasonable behavior, 108 Wis. 2d at 238 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 190 n.13.
54. 108 Wis. 2d at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
55. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 191. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nui-
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The majority found the reasonable use doctrine to be applicable
to the instant case and that its application would neither prevent
nor hinder land development.6 Justice Abrahamson observed that
this doctrine would promote the reasonable use and enjoyment of
property in a manner more consistent with modern conceptions of
land use.6" She qualified the court's holding by cautioning that
while obstruction to sunlight may constitute a nuisance in certain
instances, such a result need not always be reached. The deter-
mining factor in each case would depend on the reasonableness of
the conduct at issue." The court held that the plaintiff's complaint
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted; however, before
the plaintiff would be entitled to relief, he would have to prove the
requisite elements of an actionable nuisance, and the defendant's
conduct would be measured according to the reasonable use
doctrine.60
The defendant contended that the circuit court's grant of a sum-
mary judgment should be affirmed even if the court determined
that the private nuisance doctrine was applicable to obstructions
of access to sunlight across adjoining land. Although the circuit
court's decision was unclear, Justice Abrahamson observed that it
seemed to recognize and apply the private nuisance doctrine.6 "
However, in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, the lower court had apparently balanced the utility of the
defendant's conduct and the gravity of the harm, and concluded
that the defendant did not act unreasonably.6" Justice Abrahamson
refused to accept the circuit court's assessment.63
Justice Abrahamson observed that although the defendant's pro-
sance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 681 (1973); Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47 (1970).






62. Id. The reasonableness doctrine set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
822 (1977) provides:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal
cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land,
and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability
for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
Id.
63. 108 Wis. 2d at 241, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
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posed structure conformed with zoning regulations and deed and
building restrictions, this conformity did not per se render the de-
fendant's conduct reasonable."4 Although compliance with regula-
tions is relevant and entitled to some significance, it does not, in
and of itself, bar a nuisance claim. 5 The circuit court had incor-
rectly regarded as conclusory the fact that the plaintiff could have
avoided the harm by placing his house in a better location. e In
addition, the majority noted that the record upon which the circuit
court had ruled was inadequate to properly decide a motion for
summary judgment. 7 For the reasonable use standard to be prop-
erly applied in nuisance cases, a thorough investigation of all the
underlying facts and circumstances is required.68 The lower court's
grant of a summary judgment for the defendant was procedurally
erroneous because the court lacked the evidence necessary for a
proper determination of the issue. 9 After finding that the plaintiff
had stated a claim of common law private nuisance upon which
relief could be granted, Justice Abrahamson considered it unneces-
sary to consider the plaintiff's alternate theories of recovery 70 and
reversed and remanded the case for hearings not inconsistent with
the opinion. 1
Justice Callow, writing in dissent, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the plaintiff had established a cause of action for
private nuisance.7 ' He criticized the majority's analogy of the in-
stant case to the spite fence cases, noting that in such cases a find-
ing of malice was essential before an aggrieved landowner could be
entitled to relief. 7 He distinguished the instant case by observing
64. Id. at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
65. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 192. See Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 495, 135 N.W.2d 250,
253 (1965) ("the zoning classification is not the controlling factor, though it is, of course,
entitled to some weight"). See also infra note 99.
66. 108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
826-828 (1977).
67. 108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
68. Id.
69. Id. "Too little is known in this case of such matters as the extent of the harm to
the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies
to the plaintiff, and the costs to the defendant of avoiding the harm." Id.
70. 108 Wis. 2d at 242-43, 321 N.W.2d at 192. The court did not need to reach the
question of whether the plaintiff stated a claim under Wis. STAT. § 844.01 (1981-1982) or
under the doctrine of prior appropriation. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
71. 108 Wis. 2d at 243, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
72. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 193 (Callow, J., dissenting).
73. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 193. See, e.g., Piccirilli v. Groccia, 114 R.I. 36, 39, 327 A.2d 834,
837 (1974) (plaintiff had to prove fence constructed solely for purpose of damaging neighbor
and not for advantage of landowner who constructed fence); Schorck v. Epperson, 74 Wyo.
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that malice had not been pleaded by the plaintiff.74
The majority failed to convince Justice Callow that the three
policies underlying the court's past decisions denying landowners
rights to unobstructed sunlight were now obsolete.75 According to
Justice Callow, a landowner owns at least as much of the space
above his property as he can use.76 He observed that Fontaine-
bleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc." supported his
position that a landowner's right to the use and enjoyment of
property is superior to an adjoining landowner's interest, provided
that the use is legitimate and conforms to ordinances, statutes, and
deed restrictions.78 He considered his position necessary to uphold
underlying principles of property ownership in a free society.
79
Justice Callow criticized the majority's conclusion that society
has increasingly regulated private land use for the good of the pub-
lic.8 0 He distinguished Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.81 and Just v.
Marinette County,82 discussed in the majority opinion, because
they involved the use of police power and eminent domain and reg-
ulated private land use for the benefit of the public health, safety,
286, 287-88, 287 P.2d 467, 469 (1955) (doctrine of private nuisance is predicated 'on the idea
that one should have no legal right to make malicious use of property of no benefit to him-
self and solely to injure another). See also Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private
Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 94, 99-102 (1977) ("the ironclad rule has been that obstruction
of a neighbor's light and air is not a nuisance if it serves any useful purpose") Id. at 101
(emphasis in original).
74. 108 Wis. 2d at 244, 321 N.W.2d at 193 (Callow, J., dissenting).
75. Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
76. 108 Wis. 2d at 244, 321 N.W.2d at 193 (Callow, J., dissenting). See United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) ("a landowner owns at least as much space above ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land").
77. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960).
[I]t is universally held that where a structure serves a useful and beneficial purpose,
it does not give rise to a cause of action, either for damages or an injunction under
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, even though it causes injury to an-
other by cutting off the light and air and interfering with the view that would other-
wise be available over adjoining land in its natural state, regardless of the fact that
the structure may have been erected partly for spite.
114 So. 2d at 359.
78. 108 Wis. 2d at 245, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
79. Id. See Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A Maverick Analysis, 11
CONN. L. REV. 430 (1979).
It is fashionable to dismiss such values as deriving from a bygone era, in which people
valued development as a "goal in itself", but current market prices for real estate,
and more particularly the premiums paid for land whose zoning permits intensive
use, suggest that people still place very high values on such rights.
Id. at 443.
80. 108 Wis. 2d at 245-46, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
81. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
82. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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morals, or welfare;- on the other hand, the instant case attempted
to restrict the defendant's private right to property use, despite his
compliance with regulations and the lack of notice of restrictions
given by the plaintiff to the defendant. 3 Justice Callow observed
that the plaintiff knew of the potential problem prior to the defen-
dant's acquisition of the property, and yet sought to impose a use
restriction solely for his private benefit." He noted that the plain-
tiff could have avoided the situation and still derived the benefit of
the solar heating system by locating his house in a different place
on the property or by purchasing the adjoining property before its
acquisition by the defendant.8 Justice Callow argued that no case
authority denied that a property owner's right to the lawful use
and enjoyment of land should be vigorously protected, especially in
those cases in which the complaining adjacent landowner could
have alleviated the problem by acquiring the property himself or
through provident use of his land."'
Under the second policy consideration, Justice Callow observed
that although sunlight is an alternative energy source, the viability
of solar collectors is questionable because of their limited effi-
ciency, lack of mass production, and high cost.
87
The third policy consideration that the majority labeled as obso-
lete was that society has a significant interest in unrestricted land
development. Although Justice Callow conceded that the law has
become increasingly more concerned with aesthetics rather than
volume development, he emphasized that individuals must not use
land in such a way that would harm the public.88 The instant case
was distinguishable because it concerned solely private rights.
Stressing the community planners' concern with our country's in-
creasing population, he argued that the majority's policy argu-
83. 108 Wis. 2d at 246, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 246-47, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice
Callow indicated that the courts may have been reluctant to decide these issues in the hope
that the neighbors would reach a compromise. He expressed concern that recognition of a
cause of action for solar blockage could discourage this spirit of compromise. Id. at 246 n.2,
321 N.W.2d at 194 n.2 (Callow, J., dissenting). See Williams, supra note 79, at 441-43
("courts reasonably might conclude that ... landowners will reach contractual agreements
. . . where it is efficient to do so"); S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW 138 (1978) ("[a] deterring factor
to the use of private nuisance to assure access to direct sunlight is the resultant litigation
between neighbors").
87. 108 Wis. 2d at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
88. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 194-95 (Callow, J., dissenting). See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1,
224, N.W.2d 407 (1974). See also supra notes 48 & 52.
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ments were more relevant to a public, rather than a private, nui-
sance discussion. 9
Consequently, the dissenter preferred to defer these policy deci-
sions to the state legislature. 90 He noted that, in fact, the Wiscon-
sin legislature had recently passed legislation enabling local gov-
ernments to enact ordinances establishing procedures for
guaranteeing access to sunlight.9 " He therefore questioned the pro-
89. 108 Wis. 2d at 247-48, 321 N.W.2d at 195 (Callow, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 248, 321 N.W.2d at 195 (Callow, J., dissenting). "What is 'desirable' or 'ad-
visable' or 'ought to be' is a question of fact. What is 'necessary' or what is 'in the best
interest' is not a fact and its determination by the judiciary is an exercise of legislative
power when each involves political considerations ... " Id. See In re City of Beloit, 37 Wis.
2d 637, 644, 155 N.W.2d 633, 636 (1968). See also Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d
750, 758, 168 N.W.2d 177, 181 (1969) (the judicial role is to interpret and apply the law as it
is, not to draft statutes); Comment, supra note 35, at 126-27 (legislatures are better able to
balance competing interests where complex factual and policy problems are at issue).
91. WIs. STAT. § 66.032 (1981-1982) (effective May 7, 1982) provides in relevant part:
"Impermissible interference" means the blockage of solar energy from a collector
surface or proposed collector surface for which a permit has been granted under this
section during a collector use period if such blockage is by any structure or vegetation
on property, an owner of which was notified under sub. (3)(b). "Impermissible inter-
ference" does not include:
1. Blockage by a narrow protrusion, including but not limited to a pole or wire,
which does not substantially interfere with absorption of solar energy by a solar
collector.
2. Blockage by any structure constructed, under construction or for which a
building permit has been applied for before the date the last notice is mailed or deliv-
ered under sub. (3)(b).
3. Blockage by any vegetation planted before the date the last notice is mailed or
delivered under sub. (3)(b) unless a municipality by ordinance under sub. (2) defines
impermissible interference to include such vegetation.
Id. § 66.032(1)(f).
(3) PERMIT APPLICATIONS.
(b) an agency shall determine if an application is satisfactorily completed and
shall notify the applicant of its determination. If an applicant receives notice that an
application has been satisfactorily completed, the applicant shall deliver by certified
mail or by hand a notice to the owner of any property which the applicant proposes
to be restricted by the permit under sub. (7). The applicant shall submit to the
agency a copy of a signed receipt for every notice delivered under this paragraph. The
agency shall supply the notice form. The information on the form may include, with-
out limitation because of enumeration:
1. The name and address of the applicant, and the address of the land upon
which the solar collector is or will be located.
2. That an application has been filed by the applicant.
3. That the permit, if granted, may affect the rights of the notified owner to
develop his or her property and to plant vegetation.
4. The telephone number, address and office hours of the agency.
5. That any person may request a hearing under sub. (4) within 30 days after
receipt of the notice, and the address and procedure for filing the request.
Id. § 66.032(3)(b).
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priety of the court's involvement, especially because it could inter-
fere with a statutory scheme of development which was not yet
fully operational.2
Justice Callow's position was that the defendant's obstruction of
the plaintiff's access to sunlight was not included within the term
"invasion" as used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts9s defin-
tion of private nuisance and its application to private use and en-
joyment of land. He noted that the term "invasion" connotes a
hostile or offensive entry such as found in the cases involving nox-
ious odors, smoke, blasting, flooding, or excessive light.9 4 The dis-
senting justice cautioned that to hold that an owner who built a
home in compliance with all applicable building codes, municipal
regulations, and deed restrictions invaded another's right to the
use and enjoyment of property would be tantamount to holding
that all construction is an invasion because any construction would
have an impact upon another's use of land.95
Stressing that the defendant's conduct would have to be both
unreasonable and intentional before a private nuisance claim could
be actionable," Justice Callow remained unconvinced that the de-
fendant's lawful conduct constituted an intentional and unreasona-
ble interference. He noted that the primary consideration for un-
reasonableness is whether the conduct complained of would cause
significant harm and offend a normal person using property for
normal purposes.9 7 Justice Callow concluded that a solar heating
system is an unusually sensitive use of property. He noted that
under ordinary circumstances, the proposed construction of the de-
fendant's dwelling would not interfere with the usual person's use
and enjoyment of property. s
92. 108 Wis. 2d at 249, 321 N.W.2d at 195 (Callow, J., dissenting).
93. See supra note 30.
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 591-92. See also Williams, supra note 79, at 441
(noting significant practical differences between dust and noise and solar access blockage).
95. 108 Wis. 2d at 251, 321 N.W.2d at 196-97 (Callow, J., dissenting). "A 'view,' for
example, is modified by any construction simply because it is there." Id., 321 N.W.2d at 196
(Callow, J., dissenting).
96. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 196-97 (Callow, J., dissenting).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977) which provides that "[tihere
is liability for a nuisance only to those whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would
be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition and
used for normal purpose." Id.
98. 108 Wis. 2d at 252, 321 N.W.2d at 197 (Callow, J., dissenting). "The plaintiff can-
not, by devoting his own land to an unusually sensitive use, such as a drive-in motion pic-
ture theater easily affected by light, make a nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining defen-
dant which would otherwise be harmless." See W. PRosSER, supra note 28, at 579.
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Justice Callow stated that the circuit court had concluded that a
cause of action for nuisance did not exist because the defendant's
construction conformed to zoning regulations, building codes, and
deed restrictions and additionally, that the use of land to build a
home was reasonable. The majority had relied upon Bie v. Inger-
sol"9 to support its conclusion that compliance with deed and zon-
ing regulations was not a controlling factor in determining a nui-
sance claim. According to Justice Callow, Bie held that a business
which had no peculiar nature and conformed to deed and zoning
regulations was not a private nuisance. 100 Unlike the situation in
Bie, Justice Callow observed that the defendant's house, to be
built in compliance with all existing laws, did not have a peculiar
nature. 101 Because the defendant's conduct was not unreasonable
per se, Justice Callow would not permit a nuisance cause of action
to stand.
The majority's decision that a cause of action existed, Justice
Callow observed, undermined the foundations of property law,
which encompass a system of filing and notice in a place of public
record.102 The plaintiff did not allege such filing as would have pro-
vided the defendant, as a prospective purchaser, with notice of the
limitations on the use of the property.103 Nor was the defendant
aware that he would be forced to defend the location and design of
his home in a nuisance action although he had complied with all
restrictions of record. Justice Callow observed that the legislature,
unlike the majority, did not overlook the importance of adequate
notice to an adjoining property owner in its recently enacted legis-
lative scheme.104 He indicated that the majority's decision was in
99. 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d 250 (1965). In Bie, property owners sued to enjoin the
operation of an asphalt plant which disseminated smoke and noxious odors and created
excessive dust and dirt which was carried onto the plaintiff's adjoining property. The area
was zoned "industrial" to accomodate operation of the plant. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
modifed the lower court's order enjoining the operation of the plant in such a manner as to
cause the nuisance to be perpetual. The court held that the test is "the peculiar nature of
the business and the location of the business, not the fact that it is a business that consti-
tutes the private nuisance." Id. at 495, 135 N.W.2d at 253.
100. 108 Wis. 2d at 253, 321 N.W.2d at 198 (Callow, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 254, 321 N.W.2d at 198 (Callow, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. WIs. STAT. § 66.032(5)-(6) (1981-1982) provides:
(5) PERMIT GRANT. (a) The agency shall grant a permit if the agency determines
that:
1. The granting of a permit will not unreasonably interfere with the orderly land
use and development plans of the municipality.
2. No person has demonstrated that she or he has present plans to build a struc-
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direct conflict with legislative enactments which provided for the
granting of solar access permits.105 The implication of the major-
ity's decision was that a common law cause of action for private
nuisance could exist even in municipalities without ordinances.106
The dissenting justice noted that the record did not indicate
whether the plaintiff, in an attempt to protect his investment, had
informed the defendant of the situation prior to the defendant's
purchase. Because the plaintiff was in a better position to know of
potential problems, his inaction should have been a major factor in
determining whether a cause of action existed.107 Justice Callow
observed that the majority's disregard of notice requirements may
have unintended results such as the devaluation of property be-
cause of its proximity to a solar residence.010
Finally, Justice Callow expressed concern over the apparent ret-
ture that would create an impermissible interference by showing that she or he has
applied for a building permit prior to receipt of a notice under sub. (3)(b), has ex-
pended at least $500 on planning or designing such a structure or by submitting any
other credible evidence that she or he has made substantial progress toward planning
or constructing a structure that would create an impermissible interference; and
3. The benefits to the applicant and the public will exceed any burdens.
(b) An agency may grant a permit subject to any condition or exemption the
agency deems necessary to minimize the possibility that the future development of
nearby property will create an impermissible interference or to minimize any other
burden on any person affected by granting the permit. Such conditions or exemptions
may include but are not limited to restrictions on the location of the collector and
requirements for the compensation of persons affected by the granting of the permit.
(6)RECORD OF PERMIT. If an agency grants a permit:
(a) The agency shall specify the property restricted by the permit under sub. (7)
and shall prepare notice of the granting of the permit. The notice shall include the
identification required under s. 706.05(2)(c) for the owner and the property upon
which the solar collector is or will be located and for any owner and property re-
stricted by the permit under sub. (7), and shall indicate that the property may not be
developed and vegetation may not be planted on the property so as to create an im-
permissible interference with the solar collector which is the subject of the permit
unless the permit affecting the property is terminated under sub. (9) or unless an
agreement affecting the property is filed under sub. (10).
(b) The applicant shall record with the register of deeds of the county in which
the property is located the notice under par. (a) for each property specified under
par. (a) and for the property upon which the solar collector is or will be located.
Id.
105. 108 Wis. 2d at 255, 321 N.W.2d at 198-99 (Callow, J., dissenting). See supra note
104.
106. 108 Wis. 2d at 255, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 256, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting).
108. Id., 321 N.W.2d at 199. "I do not believe that an adjacent lot owner should be
obliged to experience the substantial economic loss resulting from the lot being rendered
unbuildable by the contour of the land as it relates to the location and design of the adjoin-
ing home using solar collectors." Id.
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rospective application of the decision, and argued that the decision
should be applied prospectively to avoid unfair surprise and hard-
ship to property owners such as the defendant. 109
American common law jurisdictions have consistently defeated a
property owner's assertion of a legal right to light across adjoining
property in the absence of an express agreement. 1 0 In contrast,
English courts have recognized rights to light under the doctrine of
"ancient lights" ' and implied easements."' According to the doc-
trine of ancient lights, if a landowner had received sunlight across
adjoining property for a specified period of time, the landowner
was entitled to continue to receive sunlight across the adjoining
property.1 " The owner thus acquired a negative prescriptive ease-
ment and could prevent the adjoining landowner from obstructing
access to sunlight. " ' The doctrines of implied easements and an-
cient lights have been treated as being synonymous.118
The doctrine of ancient lights, although initially accepted by
American courts, was repudiated as early as 1838 because it was
inconsistent with the needs of a developing country;"a by 1959, the
doctrine was unequivocally rejected in America. 1 7 American courts
have also refused to recognize easements to light by implication. '
The most often-cited example of the American position regard-
ing rights to light under any theory-ancient lights, implied ease-
ments, or private nuisance-is Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v.
Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc.1 9 In Fontainebleau, the plaintiff
109. Id. at 256-57, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting).
110. Comment, supra note 35, at 112. Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, recognizes
that a servitude of light may be acquired prescriptively. Id. n.67.
111. See, e.g., Charles Semon & Co. v. Bradford Corp., [19221 2 Ch. 737.
112. See Comment, supra note 35, at 108-15.
113. See W. THOMAS, A. MImLER & R. ROBBINS, OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 23 (1978).
114. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 289 (no American common law state recognizes a
landowner's right to acquire an easement of light by prescription).
115. See Comment, supra note 35, at 113-14.
116. See Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 (1838) (the defendant built a store block-
ing light to a dwelling erected close to the plaintiff's property line; the plaintiff was denied
relief in favor of promoting land development).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24. See also Comment, supra note 35, at
112.
118. See, e.g., Depner v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 408, 232 N.W. 851, 852 (1930)
("easements of light and air over adjacent premises are not favored (citation omitted). The
accepted doctrine is that they are not created or acquired by prescription"); Miller v. Hoes-
chler, 126 Wis. 263, 268-69, 105 N.W. 790, 792 (1905) (easements to light and air by implica-
tion repudiated generally in America).
119. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960).
1983 1175
Duquesne Law Review
owned a beach-front hotel adjacent to the defendant's hotel, the
Fontainebleau. The defendant proposed to construct a fourteen-
story addition to the Fontainebleau which the plaintiff sought to
enjoin because the shadow cast by the addition would shade the
plaintiff's beach and interfere with sunbathing. The plaintiff also
alleged that the choice for the place of the addition was actuated
partly by malice.120
In denying relief to the plaintiff, the District Court of Appeals of
Florida noted that American courts had not recognized a land-
owner's legal right to light from adjoining property absent a statu-
tory or contractual obligation.121 Thus, the plaintiff had no en-
forceable right to receive unobstructed light from the defendant's
property. The court reasoned that the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas122 applied to the lawful rights of another and
because no legal right to light was recognized, the plaintiff failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. 2 ' It was immaterial
that the building was erected partly for spite if it served a useful
and beneficial purpose. 24
Although the common law private nuisance doctrine has been
used to regulate land usage, especially in the absence of legislative
mandate,2 5 Prah is the first case to successfully apply the theory
to an asserted right to light. According to the common law theory,
now applicable to right to light cases under Prah, if the use of
one's property unreasonably interferes with the use and employ-
ment of another's property, it consituted a private nuisance.22 Not
only must the use be unreasonable, but it must also cause substan-
tial injury.
1 27
Once a nuisance is established, the plaintiff normally has three
possible remedies: self-help, an action for damages, and equitable
relief.128 The principle of abatement by self-help has ancient ori-
gins, and its principles are analagous to the privilege of using rea-
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id. at 359. The court noted that the doctrine was unanimously repudiated in
America and that at common law, the right to light would not exist in the absence of an
easement or uninterrupted use or enjoyment for twenty years. Id.
122. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). See also supra notes 48
& 52.
126. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 821D and comment b (1977). See supra
note 30.
127. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 825-828 (1977).
128. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 602.
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sonable force to protect the possession of land from trespass."'
One may invoke this remedy when there is interference with one's
interest in the enjoyment of land.130 This privilege extends to entry
upon the land of another and to the use of all reasonable forcel s in
a reasonable manner to terminate the nuisance.132
In an action for damages for private nuisance, the plaintiff may
recover the value attached to the use or enjoyment of which the
plaintiff has been deprived, the permanent diminution in value
from a permanent nuisance, specific losses, if any, and any per-
sonal discomfort or inconvenience which the plaintiff or a member
of his or her family has suffered, plus reasonable expenses. "3 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts further elaborates on the damages
available and provides for remedies for past and future inva-
sions.1 s As an alternative to recovering for a decrease in the value
of the property, the plaintiff may elect to recover restitutionary
damages plus damages for personal discomfort and inconvenience
and incidental expenses.13 5 Although the normal remedy in nui-
sance cases is to recover for past damages, the plaintiff in certain
situations may recover for future damages. 3 6 In those situations,
the plaintiff may elect to recover damages for future invasions in
the same action as that for past invasions. 3 7 The plaintiff may re-
129. Id. at 605.
130. Id. The plaintiff who elects self-help' takes his chances that he is justified, be-
cause an honest belief that one is justified will not protect him from civil liability or crimi-
nal prosecution. Id.
131. Reasonableness is determined in light of all the circumstances, including the
gravity of the nuisance and the necessity for prompt action. Id. at 606.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 602-03.
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 929, 930 (1977).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1977). Section 929 provides:
(1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion
and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation
for
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value
after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that
has been or may be reasonably incurred,
(b) the loss of use of the land, and
(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant.
(2) If a thing attached to the land but severable from it is damaged, he may at his
election recover the loss in value to the thing instead of the damage to the land as a
whole.
Id.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 (1977). Section 930 comment b provides:
"When it appears that the wrong will probably continue indefinitely, the person injured is
empowered to elect to be compensated once and for all, for prospective invasions." Id.
137. Id. Section 930 provides:
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cover for past invasions as well as either the decrease in the value
of the land caused by the prospect of a continued invasion, mea-
sured at the time when the situation became enduring, or the rea-
sonable cost to the plaintiff of avoiding future invasions. s
Notwithstanding the money damages and self-help remedies in
private nuisance cases, the most requested3 9 and most satisfactory
remedy1 0 is equitable or injunctive relief. Because the normal
standards for determining the appropriateness of equitable relief
apply in nuisance cases, it must be apparent that the remedy at
law is inadequate. 4 ' The approach to enjoining a nuisance is not
unlike the substantive determination of whether a nuisance ex-
ists-that is, by balancing the relative hardships and equities142 of
the parties against the interests of the public.14' But although it
may be decided that a nuisance exists, injunctive relief may not be
warranted.1 44 'Simple nuisances, 4 5 such as spite fences, may be
readily enjoined; however, where the defendant's activities are rea-
sonably consistent with the character of the neighborhood, a plain-
tiff may be denied equitable relief and left to a remedy at law.146 It
is also important to note that denial of injunctive relief does not
(1) If one causes continuing or recurrent tortious invasions on the land of another by
the maintenance of a structure or acts or operation not on the land of the other and it
appears that the invasions will continue indefinitely, the other may at his election
recover damages for future invasions in the same action as that for the past invasions.
(2) If the future invasions would not be enjoined because the defendant's enterprise is
affected with a public interest, the court in its discretion may rule that the plaintiff
must recover for both past and future invasions in the single action.
(3) The damages for past and prospective invasions of land include compensation for
(a) the harm caused by invasions prior to the time when the injurious situation
became complete and comparatively enduring, or the reasonable cost to the plaintiff
of avoiding future invasions.
Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977); Abdella v.
Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967); Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d
250 (1965); Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900).
140. "Private nuisance actions must encourage the use of solar energy. Therefore, the
least that should be available is damages. . . . However, such damages may be so specula-
tive as to be incapable of determination. Therefore, in the long run, injunctive relief is the
only satisfactory remedy in any nuisance action." S. KRAEMER, supra note 86, at 138.
141. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 603.
142. Equities in this sense is used to refer to the conduct of the parties. Thus factors
such as bad faith, misconduct, misleading conduct and moving to a nuisance are considered.
D. DoBBs, THE LAW OF REMEDIES 359-60 (1973).
143. Id. at 357.
144. Id.
145. Simple nuisances are those without social or private value. Id.
146. Id. at 358.
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preclude an award of monetary damages. 1 7
Despite the flexibility of the private nuisance doctrine and the
availability of remedies, application to right to light cases has
largely been unsuccessful, except for the spite fence cases which
contain the elements of malice, unattractiveness, and obstruction
of light and air. " "8 Although in these cases all three elements had
to be present, the emphasis was on the malice behind the activity,
not on the obstruction of light." 9 In Wisconsin, even attempts to
apply the common law doctrine of private nuisance to spite fence
cases have been unsuccessful absent legislative mandate. For ex-
ample, in Metzger v. Hochrein,150 the plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendant willfully and maliciously constructed an unsightly fence
which obstructed the plaintiff's view of the street and depreciated
the rental value of the plaintiff's property.151 In denying the plain-
tiff relief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court enunciated, the general
rule that whatever a man may do lawfully on his property under
any circumstances, may be done, regardless of the motive behind
the activity. 15 The prevailing view was that one had a sovereign
right to use one's property as desired, provided that the use did
not physically extend outside property boundaries to the detri-
ment of others, motive being irrelevant.5 8
Prior to Prah, the shadow of the defendant's building on adja-
cent property was not considered a physical extension beyond the
boundaries of the defendant's property, nor was it considered un-
reasonable. As the Fontainebleau court noted, if a structure served
a useful and beneficial purpose and did not contravene any stat-
utes or zoning ordinances, no cause of action for private nuisance
existed.'" Thus, in order to prevail on a claim of private nusiance
alleging obstruction of light and air, the plaintiff had to satisfy the
heavy burden of proving that a structure served no useful or bene-
ficial purpose.
Although courts have been unwilling to apply the private nui-
sance doctrine to obstruction of light cases, such hesitation was not
147. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 604.
148. See supra note 73.
149. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.08 (West 1958) (repealed 1973). See also supra note 40
for text of § 280.08.
150. 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900).
151. Id. at 268-69, 83 N.W. at 308.
152. Id. at 270, 83 N.W. at 309.
153. Id. at 272, 83 N.W. at 310.
154. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 360
(Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960).
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lacking in the application of the doctrine to situations in which
there was an obvious physical invasion such as excessive noise, " '
noxious odors,156 flooding,15 7 or dust cases.15 8 The distinction be-
tween these cases and the right to light cases appeared to be based
on the character of the intrusion-tangible versus intangible."'9
However, the underlying reason why courts have refused to recog-
nize rights to light was premised on a faulty analogy' "-because
one had no legal right to light according to the doctrines of ancient
lights and implied easements, obstructions to light could not be
considered nuisances, no matter what the impact on another's land
would be, and especially if the construction served a useful and
beneficial purpose.101
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's departure from precedent in
Prah v. Maretti is perplexing given its past reluctance to recognize
a right to light even in the most obvious spite fence cases. In place
of its characteristic deference to the legislature, the court suddenly
created a cause of action. The reason for the decision is probably
the recognition and endorsement of policy considerations concern-
ing alternative energy resources. Nevertheless, the decision per-
haps creates more problems than it solves.
One problem is that of adequate notice to the prospective pur-
chaser. As the dissent correctly points out, our system of property
law places heavy reliance on the recording system.' Yet, compli-
155. See, e.g., Borsvold v. United Dairies, 347 Mich. 672, 81 N.W.2d 378 (1957);
Guarnia v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962).
156. See, e.g., Abdella v. Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967); Bie v. Inger-
soll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d 250 (1965).
157. See, e.g., William Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Serv. Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N.W.
945, cert. denied, 134 N.W. 1064 (1911); Mueller v. Fruen, 36 Minn. 273, 30 N.W. 886
(1886).
158. See, e.g., Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966); Riblet
v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).
159. See Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 238 n.13, 321 N.W.2d 182, 190-91 n.13
(1982).
160. See Comment, Obitruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 Calif. L. Rev.
94, 99 (1977). See also supra note 53; Comment, supra note 35, at 125.
161. See Comment, supra note 160, at 99. See also Comment, supra note 35, at 126.
162. 108 Wis. 2d at 254, 321 N.W.2d at 198 (Callow, J., dissenting).
I further believe that the majority's conclusion that a cause of action exists in this
case thwarts the very foundation of property law. Property law encompasses a system
of filing and notice in a place for public records to provide prospective purchasers
with any limitations on their use of the property....
Only as a result of the majority's decision did Mr. Maretti discover that a legitimate
action exists which would require him to defend the design and location of his home
against a nuisance suit, notwithstanding the fact that he located and began to build
his house within the applicable building, municipal, and deed restrictions.
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ance with all restrictions of record was not a bar to liability on the
part of the defendant in this dispute.1" Is the prospective pur-
chaser under a duty, when inspecting property, to determine
whether his southerly neighbor utilizes a solar system which may
be impaired by the construction of a dwelling beyond a certain
height or located too close to the southern property boundary?
Clearly, a condition restricting the development of land would be
of interest to a purchaser and is of sufficient importance to require
the one restricting the use of the property to provide public notice
(perhaps as an easement).
The Wisconsin legislature in its recently enacted legislative
scheme concerning the granting of solar permits did not neglect
the issue of notice. The notice provisions require that the person
seeking to restrict the development of another's land provide no-
tice by certified mail to the one whose property will be affected
because of potential interference with a solar energy system. A per-
son may request a hearing within thirty days after receipt of notice
to contest the restrictions.1 4
Another problem with the decision is the assessment of damages.
In most instances injunctive relief would not be appropriate " be-
cause the building has already been constructed and serves a use-
ful purpose. It would constitute economic waste to require that the
structure be removed to prevent the obstruction of light. For this
reason, it is almost certain that in Prah, injunctive relief would be
denied. A more appropriate remedy would be money damages. 6'
In assessing money damages, however, the obstruction to light
cases are clearly in a different category from the traditional nui-
sance cases. They have a greater potential to persist for much
longer periods of time and abatement seems unlikely. Although
damages for future invasions are recoverable,1 67 # problem arises in
Id., 321 N.W.2d at 198.
163. Id. at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192. See Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d
250 (1965).
164. See WiS. STAT. § 66.032 (1981-1982). See also supra notes 91 and 104 for relevant
provisions of the legislation.
165. "Court injunctive orders are harsh remedies ..... Substantial economic harm
will have to be proved. S. KRAEMER, supra note 86, at 137. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 139-47.
166. "Courts may award damages as an alternative to injunctive relief. Some authori-
ties argue that any interference with another's use of his property that causes substantial
harm should be considered unreasonable and the injured party should recover damages." S.
KRAEMER, supra note 86, at 137-38. See supra text accompanying notes 128-47.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 (1977).
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determining the amount of the recovery. 68 The nuisance can theo-
retically endure for the useful life of the structure given the nature
of an obstruction to light case. Although a valuation for the de-
creased efficiency of the solar heating system is ascertainable,
physical damage resulting from frozen water and cracked panels
cannot be determined with regard to the frequency or amount of
damage. a19 Nor does it seem satisfactory to require the injured
party to bring suit every time damage occurs. Thus, the assessment
of money damages presents many problems, the solution of which
may result in inequities to both parties.
Another problem with regard to the assessment of damages ex-
ists with the defendant's conduct. In the instant case, the defen-
dant continued construction of the home with knowledge of the
pending appeal.1 70 By the time the case was heard on the merits he
had presented the court with a fait accompli. Because the dwelling
had already been constructed, he had effectively limited the reme-
dies available to the plaintiff because it is extremely unlikely that
a court would order injunctive relief in this circumstance. 71 Given
the situation, are punitive damages relevant in the determination
of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct?17 2 In Prah the
answer would be difficult because the issue is clouded with a notice
problem and the defendant's reliance on precedent.
Another factor for jurisdictions examining this decision to con-
sider, aside from policy considerations, is the adequacy of piece-
meal decisions versus a comprehensive legislative scheme.1 73 The
efficiency of settling these cases on a case-by-case basis may bur-
den courts, and in many instances long periods of time may elapse
before the issue is settled, burdening the litigants as well.
174
In Wisconsin as well, a problem exists with Prah v. Maretti. The
decision is of limited utility because of legislation concerning the
granting of solar permits recently enacted by the Wisconsin legisla-
ture which arguably supersedes the private nuisance cause of ac-
tion. The statutory scheme specifically provides that an impermis-
168. See S. KRAEMER, supra note 86, at 138 (damages may be so speculative as to be
incapable of determination).
169. Id.
170. 108 Wis. 2d at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 184. "Nevertheless, the defendant began con-
struction." Id., 321 N.W.2d at 184.
171. See supra note 165.
172. See supra note 142 for a consideration of some of the factors relevant in the
determination of damages.
173. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 289. See also, Comment, supra note 35.
174. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 289. See also Comment, supra note 35.
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sible interference does not include blockage by any structure
constructed, under construction, or for which a building permit has
been applied in the absence of notice. 175 Thus, under the new stat-
utory scheme, the result in Prah may have been different.
Because the legislation appears to overrule this decision, the
precedential value of Prah v. Maretti is limited only to those
causes of action accruing before May 7, 1982, and for which the
statute of limitations has not expired. In those cases, a court must
afford adequate consideration to notice as well as the assessment
of damages. Perhaps Judge Callow was justified in advocating def-
erence to the legislature, not merely because the legislature has al-
ready acted in this area, but because it had time to deliberate and
resolve the issues overlooked or left unanswered by this decision.
Mary G. Isban
175. See WIs. STAT. § 66.032 (1981-1982).
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